. A game theoretic model of kleptoparasitism with strategic arrivals and departures of beetles at dung pats.
. Here, we will focus on female behavior. The females of O.
taurus lay eggs in carefully constructed tunnels under the soil's surface and 23 beneath a dung pat deposited by a large herbivore (Crowe et al., 2009 ). The 24 time that a given dung pat is usable is dependent on climatic conditions, 25 particularly temperature and humidity. This time can range from a few 26 hours to several days (Moczek et al., 2002) . Potential parasities can benefit 27 from stealing a ball in two ways. They can gain nourishment by eating the 28 egg of the previous owner, and they can save time in preparing their own ball 29 by using the existing one for their own egg, if the dung is not too old. It has 30 been documented that female dung beetles will routinely access brood balls 31 made by other females and replace existing eggs with their own (Moczek and 32 Cochrane, 2006) . Female dung beetles have been documented to guard their 33 brood balls against thieving beetles (Hunt and Simmons, 2002) . 34 Crowe et al. (2009) modelled this situation as a random process, focusing 35 on a population of beetles on a single dung pat. They concluded that in 36 general if stealing opportunities presented themselves then they should be 37 taken, and that guarding may or may not be the best strategy depending 38 upon ecological conditions. However, the model of Crowe et al. (2009) did 39 not consider the time aspect at all. Beetles usually use all the dung from 40 a dung pat within a period of four days (Bertone et al., 2006) , and do not 41 spend large periods of time on a single dung pat, but move from pat to pat.
Model

47
In this paper we consider a model of dung pats visited by a large (effec-48 tively infinite) population of beetles. It is assumed that it is always in the 49 interest of beetles to steal if they get the opportunity (i.e. if they encounter 50 the brood ball of a beetle which has already left the pat), but that beetles 51 can vary their time of arrival and departure at a pat, and that any particular 52 beetle will enter (and leave) a pat when the dung in the pat reaches a cer-53 tain age. The strategies in our model will thus consist of a pair of numbers, 54 which are the choice of the age of the dung when a beetle arrives and departs 55 a patch. For simplicity we consider only the day of arrival and the day of 56 departure, so that strategies are pairs of positive integers, and we assume 57 that a beetle must stay at least one day. Whilst this is a simplification, it unpublished manuscript) also suggests that breeding pairs or females remain 64 in the proximity of the brood balls for an extended period of time.
65
A beetle's strategy is determined by 66 • the age of dung (in days) when it enters a dung pat, x ∈ {1, 2, 3}
67
• the age of dung (in days) when it leaves a dung pat, y ∈ {x + 1, ..., 4}
68
We will denote each strategy as (x, y). We thus have six strategies:
69 Ω = (1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4) .
(1)
A dung beetle following strategy (x, y) enters dung of age x. If x = 1, the κN Bdt balls will be stolen in total. Once a beetle steals a ball, it does not 95 attempt to steal another one. Hence
where B 0 (N 0 ) is the number of balls (beetles) at time 0. Hence, N is the 97 solution of the differential equation
The solution of (3) is
Note that the second formula is a limit of the first when B 0 − N 0 → 0. We 100 will thus use the first formula (and approach the appropriate limit where 101 necessary). Up to scaling (in κ), we may assume that beetles have time t = 1 102 to steal the eggs. Thus after N beetles have come to a dung pat with B 103 balls, there will be
balls left, while the beetles have stolen
balls in total. Note that the above formulae approach the right numbers in 106 the limiting cases, when the numerator and denominator both tend to zero.
107
When κ approaches ∞ (i.e. when beetles are very effective in finding and 108 stealing the balls) then
which means that the beetles find and steal all the balls (if there are more 110 beetles than balls) or that every beetle steals one ball for herself (if there 111 are more balls than beetles). Similarly, as B 0 approaches ∞ (and κ > 0, i.e.
112
there is some chance of stealing), we get
which means that every beetle gets to steal a ball for her own egg (while leav-114 ing the total number of balls effectively constant). Finally, as N 0 approaches 115 ∞, we get that B(1) ≈ 0, meaning that beetles find and steal every possible 116 egg. 117
Determining Fitness
118
We will denote the fitness, or reproductive success, of a strategy (x, y) ∈ Ω 119 by f xy . The fitness is the (average) rate at which brood balls produced by 120 a beetle using strategy (x, y) reach maturity in a population described by P 121 minus any costs involved in producing a brood ball. Here P = P ω , ω ∈ Ω ,
122
where P xy is the proportion of the population using strategy (x, y). Evolution through time according to this fitness, on a timescale that is long in com-126 parison to the three day interactions that we describe. We investigate such 127 changes, and in particular look for stable population mixtures, evolutionarily 128 stable strategies (ESSs).
129
A beetle using strategy (x, y) works for y−x days on provisioning (stealing 130 and/or making a brood ball plus potential guarding). This also means that 131 beetles using strategy (x, y) can be found in pats that are x, x + 1, . . . , y − 1 132 days old. We assume that dung pats are produced at a constant rate, and 133 that the beetles are equally distributed in time and space. Thus, the effective 134 number of beetles using strategy (x, y), denoted N e xy , that can be found on 135 a single dung pat of age between x and y − 1 is
This yields the formula for fitness of a strategy to be
where B i xy is the number of undamaged brood balls beetles using strategy 138 (x, y) have in their possession in a dung pat of age i, and ρ x,y is the probability 139 that an individual using (x, y) made its own brood ball.
140
B 3 xy is determined by the number of brood balls produced (made or stolen) 141 by beetles using strategy (x, y), minus the number of brood balls stolen from 142 them. In order to determine B 3 xy (which is necessary to find f xy ) for each 143 strategy, we will determine B 1 xy and B 2 xy .
144
Note that we have assumed that there is effectively no cost in searching Only beetles using strategies (1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4) come on the first day of 152 the dung pat. There is nothing to steal and they all make their own balls.
153
We thus have
Day 2 155
Strategies (1, 3) and (1, 4) continue to guard their brood balls, so their 156 brood balls will not be stolen. The only brood balls that can be stolen come 157 from strategy (1, 2); and the only beetles that can steal these balls are using a 158 strategy (2, 3) or (2, 4). Hence, there are B 1 12 balls to be stolen by (N e 23 +N e 24 ) 159 beetles to steal them, we use 5 and get
where
Above, σ 2 denotes the fraction of the balls that got stolen (using 6). Note 162 that (2, 3) and (2, 4) may steal, but those beetles that did not steal can 163 make a ball of their own. In total, each such beetle will have a ball in their 164 possession. Thus, we get by (6), beetles using strategy (3, 4) will steal
balls. Assuming that stolen balls are selected at random, the fraction B 2 12 /V 3 174 of those stolen balls belonged to (1, 2) beetles and similarly for other strate-175 gies. We thus get
The corresponding fitnesses then follow from (11) (11), (21) and (22) that, under any circumstances,
Now we compare strategies (1, 3) and (2, 3). Each has the same probability 185 of losing any brood ball that they make (if it is stolen by a (3, 4) individual).
186
(2, 3) has no greater cost per ball, as (1, 3) 
Finally, since κ > 0 (i.e. beetles can steal something), we get that σ 2 > 0 191 and thus since ρ 2,3 ≤ ρ 1,2 = 1,
This means that we can restrict ourselves to the analysis of the case where 195 Thus (2, 3), (2, 4) must make their own brood balls and ρ 2,y = 1 for y = 3, 4.
The fitness of the respective beetles becomes 
where the new factor κ is just a rescaling of the original factor κ,
3.1. Pure strategies 199 We shall first consider each pure strategy in turn, assuming the popu- 
so that (2, 3) is an ESS when f 23 is the largest of the three fitnesses i.e. 205 κ < − ln(ε).
When the population consists of almost all (3, 4) strategists, the fitnesses of 206 the three strategies are
For (3, 4) to be an ESS we need ε >max(1/2, e −κ ). Note that such a popu-208 lation is not realistic, since it consists only of individuals who arrive too late 209 to lay their own eggs, and so no eggs are ever laid. Provided that the cost 210 of egg laying is not unfeasibly large, then this is not an ESS, and we shall 211 discount it. In general we shall assume that ε < 1/2.
212
Finally when the population consists of almost all (2, 4) strategists, the 213 fitnesses of (2, 4) is f 24 = 1/2 − ε. It can thus be invaded by (2, 3) strategists 214 whose fitness is f 23 = 1 − ε. Thus, (2, 4) is never an ESS. We shall first consider populations consisting of two of the three strate-217 gies only. For any particular mixture to be an ESS, the payoffs to the two 218 strategies involved must be equal, and greater than the payoff to the third 219 strategy 220
First we consider a pair including (2, 3) and (2, 4). We have p 34 = 0, so 221 that f 23 = 1 − ε, f 24 = 1/2 − ε. 
For stability against small changes in the relative frequency of the two types 229 in the equilibrium we need h (P 23 ) < 0 where the differentiation is with 230 respect to P 23 . It happens if and only if
It is easy to show that the left hand side of (39) is zero at P 23 = 1/2, positive 232 when P 23 > 1/2 and negative when P 23 < 1/2. This, together with the fact 
In addition we need stability against invasion by P 24 . We will first evalu-238 ate the mean fitness in a mixture satisfying (38). Since pats are visited daily 239 by all females, the ratio of the number of brood balls hatching daily to the 240 number of females is simply the proportion of females building balls, P 23 .
241
This is also the proportion of females who pay the costs of building a brood 242 ball. Hence, f 23 = f 34 = P 23 (1 − ε) . Thus, f 23 > f 24 = 1/2 − ε is equivalent
This inequality defines a region in parameter space which has a boundary 245 defined by when > is replaced by = in (41). This boundary thus occurs when 246 P 23 = 1−2ε 2(1−ε) and thus when
Rearranging (38) gives
which using the rearrangements in (42) leads to the boundary condition as
It is clear that invasion by P 24 is resisted if and only if κ lies on one side 250 of the critical value given by (44), and simple verification indicates that the 251 required condition is
The right-hand term of (45) always lies between the two limits of (40) for 253 ε < 0.5 so that we have a pair (2, 3) and (3, 4) if and only if
Mixtures of all three pure strategies 255
For an internal equilibrium we require the fitness of all three strategies 256 to be identical. By (27) 
Substituting (47) into (48) we obtain
Thus we have,
which substituted into (47) gives
Rearranging (50) and (51) we obtain an internal equilibrium when
whenever the three terms are all positive, which (assuming ε < 1/2) occurs 263 if and only if
We believe that this equilibrium is also an ESS in all cases, as suggested by 265 our numerical results, but we have not been able to prove this. 
Dynamics
267
We consider evolutionary dynamics, using the classical replicator equation
268
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998)
wheref is the mean payoff in the population. The dynamics yields four 270 different outcomes, as in the ESS analysis above, see Figure 1 .
271
It is hard to prove results regarding the replicator dynamics in a case 272 with non-linear payoffs as in this paper, and we shall restrict ourselves to 273 observing the outcome of simulations. There are four distinct cases, based upon comparing the value of κ with 283 three progressively larger functions of ε. We illustrate these in Figure 2 .
then there is a unique pure (2, 3) ESS which is globally stable. If
then there are two ESSs, a pure (2, 3) ESS and a mixed ESS combining the 287 two strategies (2, 3) and (3, 4). If
then there are again two solutions, a pure (2, 3) ESS and an internal equilib-289 rium combining all three strategies. Finally if
there is a unique internal equilibrium.
291
We can thus see that when brood balls are difficult to find (when com- parasites. Finally for brood balls that are very easy to find, the pure strategy 302 is no longer an ESS, and the mixture of three is the unique solution.
Discussion
304
In this paper we have considered a dynamic model of the creation, par-305 asitism and defence of brood balls by a common species of dung beetle. As 306 the quality of dung quickly declines over a small period of days, beetles must 307 move between pats to give their offspring a good chance of survival. We have 308
shown that under different circumstances, three distinct strategies can sur- 
320
The key factors which affect the mixture of individuals are two key pa-321 rameters, the ease of finding brood balls to steal, and the cost of making your 322 own ball. The harder balls are to find, and the lower the cost of making a 323 ball, the more the strategy (2, relatively dried out at that point). The number of beetles in the soil below 337 the pat is significantly lower than the numbers in the pat and that beetles 338 do not make their way below the pat until about 24hrs after pat creation.
339
The data also indicates that the act of burying dung (to create brood balls) 340 does not begin until the pat is at least 12 hrs old. Thus O. taurus likely uses 341 different aged pats for different things. Although the density may be high 342 in newly created dung pats (12 hrs or less old) the adults are likely to be 343 feeding (not all feeding beetles use a dung pat for brood ball production as 344 the density of beetles found below a dung pat is significantly lower than the 345 number of beetles within the dung pat).
346
A key assumption of our model is that all beetles are potential parasites 347 and whether they parasitise or not is governed by their arrival and departure 348 strategies. In real populations beetles do indeed arrive and depart at very 349 different times (Crowe, 2011) and it seems reasonable to assume that they 350 would take the opportunity to parasitise if the chance presented itself (Crowe are easy to find (e.g. see Figure 1d ).
358
We have also assumed that beetles only arrive or leave at discrete times, 359 and this is clearly a simplification as in real populations they arrive and de-360 part throughout the day. However, our aim was to make the model tractable 361 whilst retaining the key features of beetles being able to arrive or depart at 362 early or late times, and stay for short or long periods. Similarly the bee-363 tles search for brood balls is idealized, effectively assuming random searching 364 with balls spread evenly across the search area; we again retain the key fea-365 ture of balls being either easy or hard to find. Finally we assumed that dung 366 was usable if sufficiently young, and not after a cut-off point. If dung deteri-367 orated in quality, then it may be possible that arrival on the first day could 368 be a playable strategy.
369
It would be of great interest to obtain realistic estimates of our two key 370 parameters ε and κ from real populations to see how well our predictions 371 match reality. One can extend the model by incorporating another param-372 eter, the effectiveness of guarding (treated as 100% in the current model).
373
The parameter may be negatively correlated with the cost of egg produc-374 tion and depend on to what degree a female can guard the brood ball and 375 feed simultaneously. Further model developments including using continu-376 ous rather than discrete arrival and departure times, and potentially more 377 complex searching strategies for the beetles, would also help improve our 378 understanding of these important and fascinating animals.
